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CRIMINAL LAW-THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE FELONY
MURDER RULE IN MASSACHUSETTS AFTER COMMONWEALTH V.
MATCHETT,

386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Massachusetts cases have frequently stated that a homicide that
occurs during the commission or attempted commission of a felony
constitutes murder. l The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
has declared that "the common law felony-murder doctrine is . . .
part of our criminal law" and that to prove a charge of murder under
that rule, the prosecution need only "establish that the defendant
. . . committed a homicide while engaged in the commission of a
felony."2 Despite the seemingly forthright nature of these state
ments, however, the supreme judicial court, on June 14, 1982, re
versed a second degree murder conviction because it might have
been based on the felony-murder ru1e. 3 The court's holding in Com
monwealth v. Matchett 4 represents a fundamental change in the
treatment of felony-murder cases in Massachusetts, a change which
virtually abrogates the felony-murder rule or at least drastically re
stricts the scope of its application.
In a case of first impression on the issue of the applicability of
1. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 729 n.2, 405 N.E.2d 939,
944 n.2 (1980); Commonwealth v. LePage, 352 Mass. 403, 420, 226 N.E.2d 200, 211
(1967); Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 411-12, 58 N.E.2d 241,246 (1944);
Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 315, lSI N.E. 297, 299-300 (1926); Com
monwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 253, 54 N.E. 551,555 (1899); Commonwealth v.
Pemberton, 118 Mass. 36,43 (1875). See also Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555,
567, 141 N.E.2d 269, 275 (1957); Commonwealth v. Venuti, 315 Mass. 255, 258, 52
N.E.2d 392, 394 (1943).
2. Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 512, 209 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1965).
3. Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 511, 436 N.E.2d 400, 412 (1982). At
one point during jury instructions, the judge charged the jury in the following manner:
"If you find. . . that the defendant was engaged in an attempted extortion, and that as a
matter of probable consequence of the commission of that extortion, [the decedent) was
killed, then you would find the defendant . . . guilty of murder in the second degree."
Id. at 502 n.l1, 436 N.E.2d at 407 n.l1. This charge was in error because it did not
require enough of the jury. Under the Matchett holding, to find a defendant guilty of
murder in the context of a homicide occurring during an extortion, the jury must not only
find an extortion and a resultant death, but also that the means used by the defendant in
the commission of the extortion demonstrate a conscious disregard of the risk to human
life. Id. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410.
4. 386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982).
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the felony-murder rule to the crime of extortion,S the supreme judi
cial court held, in Matchett, that the felony-murder rule can be in
voked in that context only when the jury finds that the extortion
involved "circumstances demonstrating the defendant's conscious
disregard of the risk to human life."6 After Matchett, the finding of
an extortion no longer proves malice in the related killing; rather, it
raises the issue of the existence of malice. On that issue, the jury
may consider whether the means used in the commission of the fel
ony demonstrate a conscious disregard of the risk to human life. 7 If
the jury so finds, then, presumably, the felony-murder rule may be
invoked and the defendant found guilty of murder.
Having determined, however, the existence of a conscious disre
gard of the risk to human life and thereby having determined the
issue of malice, the jury need not then, as the court suggests, invoke
the felony-murder rule. Because the felony-murder rule is used
solely to achieve a finding ofmalice,8 once malice has been found by
other means, the felony-murder rule has no function in the calculus
of proof of the crime of murder. In the same opinion in which the
court claimed to articulate a use for the felony-murder rule in the
context of extortion when the jury finds a conscious disregard of the
risk to human life, the court in fact obviated any need for the felony
murder rule at all.
Moreover, the implications of the holding in Matchett are not
confined to the statutory crime of extortion. In Commonwealth v.
Moran,9 the court extended its holding in Matchett to the crime of
unarmed robberyIO and, possibly, beyond. I I In Moran, the court
enunciated "the Matchett principle" as a rule of law that applies not
only to extortion and unarmed robbery, but to any felony, statutory
or common law, that can be committed without danger to human
life. 12 The court justified its action on the ground that criminallia
bility for murder is not warranted absent a culpable mental state
with respect to the underlying homicide. 13
Because it is possible for all felonies traditionally associated
with the felony-murder rule to be committed without danger to
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.

Id. at 504, 436 N.E.2d at 408.
Id. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410.
Id. at 511, 436 N.E.2d at 412.
See infra text accompanying note 56.
387 Mass. 644, 442 N.E.2d 399 (1982).
Id. at 650, 442 N.E.2d at 403.
See id. at 650-51,442 N.E.2d at 403.
See id.
Id. at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403.
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human life, a strict application of the Matchett principle will forbid
the invocation of the felony-murder rule in the trial of any homicide
occurring during the commission of a felony unless the jury first find
that the circumstances of the commission of the felony demonstrate
the defendant's conscious disregard of the risk to human life. Fail
ure to so instruct the jury appears to be reversible error. Yet, the use
of the felony-murder rule after an express finding, on the issue of
malice, of a conscious disregard of the risk of human life appears to
be superfluous. While there remains in the law of homicide in the
Commonwealth the form and appearance of the felony-murder rule,
the Matchett principle eviscerates that rule. As a result, the status of
the law is unclear. This casenote will analyze and clarify the Match
ett principle and recommend that the court abrogate the felony-mur
der rule openly. This step would bring clarity to the law and, at the
same time, return the issue of malice to its historical status as a ques
tion of fact for the jury, not a question of law. 14
II.

FACTS

In a poker game in the fall of 1977, David Colvin lost approxi
mately $1500 to Arthur Samson. ls On February 12, 1979, Samson
hired Brian Matchett to help collect the debt. 16 The next day, Sam
son and Matchett went to Colvin's home together, with Samson en
tering first and Matchett following shortly thereafter.I7 Within
minutes, the heavily-armed 18 Matchett shot Colvin twice and left
him lying on the floor. 19 Defendant20 was charged with a number of
crimes, the most serious being murder. 21 At trial, the judge in
14. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
IS. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 493,436 N.E.2d at 402.
16. Id at 493-94, 436 N.E.2d at 402.
17. Id at 495,436 N.E.2d at 403.
18. Defendant was carrying on his person a .38 caliber revolver, a .25 caliber pistol,
a large knife, and a pair of handcuffs; in addition, a sawed-off shotgun, a sword cane, and
a large German shepherd dog were available in his car. Id at 500, 509, 436 N.E.2d at
406, 411. There was evidence that the .38 caliber revolver was loaded, at least in part,
with hollow point bullets. Brief for Appellant at 14, Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386
Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982); Brief for Appellee at 12, Commonwealth v. Matchett,
386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982).
19. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 496-97, 436 N.E.2d at 403-04. The victim died two days
later. Id at 497, 436 N.E.2d at 404. At trial, defendant admitted shooting the victim, but
claimed he did so in self-defense. Id at 496, 436 N.E.2d at 404.
20. Samson and Matchett were codefendants at trial. Samson was, however, ac
quitted of all charges. Id at 493 n.2, 436 N.E.2d at 402 n.2. The word "defendant" will
be used herein to signify Matchett alone.
21. Id at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402. The other charges were for weapons violations.
Id
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structed the jury that it could return a verdict of guilty of murder in
the first degree based upon a finding of deliberately premeditated
malice aforethought or upon the application of the felony-murder
rule, with the underlying felony being an armed assault in a dwelling
house with the intent to commit a felony; alternately, the jury could
return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree based upon
a finding of express malice aforethought or upon the application of
the felony-murder rule, with the underlying felony being statutory
extortion. 22 The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the
second degree 23 and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment 24
with the possibility of parole after fifteen years. 25 From this convic
tion, defendant appealed,26 asserting, inter alia, that the trial judge
erred in instructing the jury that it could return a verdict of murder
in the second degree under the felony-murder rule because the com
mon law felony-murder rule is inapplicable to the statutory crime of
extortion. 27
In a six-to-one decision, the supreme judicial court held that
because statutory extortion can be committed in a way not inher
ently dangerous to human life, a defendant cannot be convicted of
murder through the application of the felony-murder rule to that
crime unless the jury were to find that the extortion "involved cir
cumstances demonstrating the defendant's conscious disregard of the
22. Id at 497-98, 436 N.E.2d at 404. A crime punishable by death or imprison
ment in the state prison is a felony; all other crimes are misdemeanors. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § I (West 1970). Armed assault in a dwelling house carries a possi
ble punishment of life imprisonment. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 18A (West
1970). Extortion by threat carries a possible punishment of 15 years' imprisonment. Id
ch. 265, § 25. A felony-murder conviction based upon a felony punishable by death or
life imprisonment is deemed first degree murder, id ch. 265, § I; all other felony-murders
are second degree murders, id
23. Malcheff, 386 Mass. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402. Defendant was also convicted
of unlawfully carrying the sawed-off shotgun and the two handguns, id, in violation of
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10 (West 1970), which makes it a crime, inler alia, to
carry firearms on the person or in a vehicle without a license.
24. Malcheff, 386 Mass. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402.
25. Brief for Appellee at 27, Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 436
N.E.2d 400 (1982). Defendant was also sentenced to concurrent terms of three to five
years for carrying the handguns without a license and five to seven years for possession
of the sawed-off shotgun. Malcheff, 386 Mass. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402.
26. Malcheff, 386 Mass. at 493, 436 N .E.2d at 402. Defendant also appealed the
convictions on the weapons charges. Id. Those convictions, with which this case note is
not concerned, were affirmed by the supreme judicial court. Id. at 511, 436 N.E.2d at
412.
27. Id at 493,498-99,436 N.E.2d at 402, 405. See infra notes 98-111 and accom
panying text.
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risk to human life_"28 To understand fully the implications of that
holding, it is necessary to consider briefly the common law and statu
tory development of the law of murder in England and the United
States, particularly with reference to the concept of malice
aforethought
III.

A

BRIEF SURVEY OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAW OF MURDER

A

In General

Murder is "homicide committed with malice aforethought."29
Because homicide is "the killing. of a human being by another
human being,"30 murder is the killing, with malice aforethought, of
one human being by another. 31
"Malice aforethought," the mens rea of murder, is a legal term
of art, the meaning of which cannot be derived from its constituent
elements. 32 To be guilty of murder, a defendant must have acted
with malice,33 but this does not necessarily refer to any feeling of
animosity or hostility.34 Early in the history of the English common
law of murder, the judges understood "malice" to require an intent
to kill. 35 Over the course of time, however, the common law evolved
as the judges sought to deem as murder conduct that resulted in
homicide, but that occurred in a context lacking an intent to kill. 36
At first, this requirement was met by finding an "implied intent" to
kill;37 later, it became apparent that an actual intent to kill is not
always required for murder. 38
28. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410.
29. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 57 (3d ed. 1982) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter cited as PERKINS & BOYCE]. See a/so Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass.
403,411-12,58 N.E.2d 241, 246 (1944).
30. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 46 (footnote omitted).
31. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 528 (1972) [hereinaf
ter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTI] (murder is the unlawful killing of another living human
being with malice aforethought).
32. See Commonwealth v. Starling, 382 Mass. 423, 428-29, 416 N.E.2d 929, 932-33
(1981). See a/so PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 57, 73.
33. LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note 31, at 534.
34. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 58. See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note
31, at 528-29.
35. PERKINS & BOYCE,SUpra note 29, at 59. See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note
31, at 529.
36. See LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note 31, at 529.
37. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 59.
38. Id An intent to inflict great bodily injury may constitute "malice afore
thought," id, as would an unintentional killing during the commission of a felony,
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With the evolution of the English common law, moreover, the
"aforethought" component came to be less and less important. A
"well-laid plan" was no longer required to be proven in a prosecu
tion for murder;39 it was enough that the fatal conduct not be the
result of afterthought. 40
As a result, it has been suggested that "malice aforethought" is a
misleading expression whose function in the law of homicide would
be better served by the phrase "man-endangering-state-of-mind,"
which may be taken to mean "every attitude of mind which includes
(1) an intent to kill, or (2) an intent to inflict great bodily injury, or
(3) an intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of an unrea
sonable human risk. . . ,or (4) an intent to perpetrate a dangerous
felony."41 "Malice aforethought" identifies any of these four states
of mind when it exists in the absence of justification, excuse, or
mitigation. 42
In the common law of England, there were no degrees of mur
43
der. The gradation of murder was a legislative development,44 oc
curring in response to then-current ideas of crime and punishment.
Under the English common law, murder was punishable by death.45
Because murder can occur in a wide variety of ways, however, the
degree of culpability of each defendant varies from case to case.
Recognizing that different degrees of culpability warrant different
punishments, the Pennsylvania legislature, in 1794, passed a statute
which divided murder into two degrees, the greater of which re
tained the punishment of death and the lesser, the punishment of life
imprisonment. 46 The "Pennsylvania pattern" is typical of murder
statutes in the United States. It provides that:
[A]ll murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by
lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and pre
meditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 529. See a/so Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15
(1868).
39. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 58.
40. fd Professors Perkins and Boyce suggest that a definition of murder as "homi
cide committed with malice" would serve the law of homicide well. fd. at 57-58 .
. 41. fd at 73. See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 528. These types of
murder exist today in most jurisdictions. fd.
42. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 73-75. See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra
note 31, at 534.
43. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 562.
44. fd
45. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
46. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 127.
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of, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary,
shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of
murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree. 47

Because this type of statute concerns itself only with murder,
that crime is the starting point in interpreting such a statute. But the
statute itself does not define the crime; for definition, resort must be
made to the common law. 48 The statute merely provides a formula
for categorizing common law murders49 as either first degree murder
or second degree murder. Once those murders which constitute first
degree murder are specified, the remainder50 constitute second de
gree murder.

B. The Common Law Felony-Murder Rule
At common law, a homicide is murder "if it falls within the
scope of the felony-murder rule_"51 At the early English common
law, the felony-murder rule was quite literal: homicides were within
its scope if they occurred during the commission or attempted com
mission of a felony.52 As to causation, however, the phrase "during
the commission of' requires more than mere coincidence of time and
place; to invoke the felony-murder rule, it must be that but for the
commission of the felony, the death would not have occurred. 53
In application, the felony-murder rule does not obviate the re
quirement that the prosecutor prove malice to secure a murder con
viction. 54 Rather, the intent to commit the underlying felony serves
47. Id (quoting Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 16 (1868» (emphasis added).
The wording is that of the March 31, 1860 Act.
48. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 530, 568 & n.56. See a/so PERKINS &
BOYCE, supra note 29, at 128-29.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31, 41-42.
50. Generally, these include intent-to-kill murder which is not deliberate and pre
meditated, intent-to-infiict-great-bodily-injury murder, murder occurring as the result of
an act in wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human risk, and felony-mur
der for which the underlying felony is not listed. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 568.
51. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 61 (footnote omitted).
52. Id at 61-62. "[I)fone intends to do another a felony, and undesignedly kills a
man, this is ... murder." Id at 62 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ·200
01). See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTT,supra note 31, at 545.
The felony-murder rule is of dubious origin and history. For a brief analysis of this
doctrine, see People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 689-707, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307-16 (1980),
and the opinion of Justice Ryan at 409 Mich. at 739-43, 299 N.W.2d at 332-33 (Ryan, I.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
53. PERKINS & BOYCE,SUpra Dote 29, at 67. Seea/so LAFAVE & SCOTT,supra note
31, at 545-46, 555-57.
54. PERKINS & BOYCE,SUpra note 29, at 71. See a/so Aaron, 409 Mich. at 716-17,
299 N.W.2d at 321.
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to show malice aforethought. 55 The subtlety of this concept is ex
plained in this way:
[T]he mens rea or "malice" necessary for the felony is. . . differ
ent from the mens rea or "malice aforethought" required for mur
der; but for certain killings the law will allow the latter to be
conclusively proved from the former. This is not to identify them
at all-it is merely to say that in certain cases proof of the particu
lar state of mind required for murder will be established by the
mens rea of certain felonies; it will be malice "implied" rather
than "express." The difference is significant for it preserves the
felony-murder rules [sic] as a mens rea-imposing mechanism. 56

In this way, the rule establishes felony-murder as a fourth category
of murder by providing a "separate definition of malice"57 in addi
tion to an intent (1) to kill, (2) to inflict great bodily injury, and (3) to
act in wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human
risk.58
The practical result of the application of the felony-murder rule,
recognizing that the intent to commit the underlying felony estab
lishes the mens rea of murder, is clearly seen in the context of the
early common law. When the felony-murder rule was first con
ceived, all felonies were punishable by death. 59 A prisoner who had
successfully committed a felony forfeited his life upon conviction. A
prisoner whose attempt had failed, however, was guilty merely of a
misdemeanor6° and did not, therefore, face a death sentence. The
felony-murder rule was designed to be used when an attempt to
commit a felony both failed and incidentally caused a homicide. 61 A
homicide committed under such circumstances was deemed mur
der 62 and the defendant was sentenced to death. 63 It may seem,
then, that the intended effect of the felony-murder rule at common
55. Aaron,409 Mich. at 717, 299 N.W.2d at 321. See also LAFAVE & ScoTT,supra
note 31, at 534. "The felony-murder doctrine ascribes malice aforethought to the felon
who kills in the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony." People v. Washington,
62 Cal.2d 777, 780, 402 P.2d 130, 133,44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (1965) (citations omitted).
56. Morris, The Felon's Responsibility jor the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L.
REV. 50,60-61 (1956).
57. Aaron,409 Mich. at 716-17, 299 N.W.2d at 321.
58. See supra text accompanying note 33.
59. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 70. "The judgment against a felon is, that
he be hanged." Id n.78 (quoting 3 INST. ·47). See also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31,
at 546 n.4.
60. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 70.
61. Seeid
62. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
63. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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law was to deter, by raising the specter of a death sentence should
life be lost, would-be felons from attempting to commit any felony
and, most particularly, to discourage attempts at those felonies
which, by their nature, carry some risk of the loss of life. Because no
one attempts a felony with the intent to fail, however, the felony
murder rule could not have raised the specter of a death sentence,
since a would-be felon necessarily courted that very punishment
from the moment he embarked, intent on success, on a felonious
course of action. The felony-murder rule, then, actually served to
remove, through execution, the criminal element of English society.
The punishment for felony-murder complemented the common law
punishment for felony: the latter led to the execution of felons; the
former, to the execution of those whose attempt at committing a fel
ony caused the death of another. 64
As the common law developed in both England and the United
States, the scope of the felony-murder rule was narrowed by judges
who viewed the doctrine as harsh and anachronistic. The reach of
the felony-murder rule was progressively restricted to the point that
the rule could have been restated as: "Homicide resulting from any
felony committed in a dangerous way is murder."65 In one English
case,66 the trial court instructed the jury:
[I]nstead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a fel
ony and which causes death amounts to murder, it would be rea
sonable to say that any act known to be dangerous to life, and
likely in itself to cause death done for the purpose of committing a
felony which caused death, should be murder. 67

A similar result, the rejection of the idea that any and all felonies
serve equally well to invoke the felony-murder rule, obtained in
American case law. 68 In an early case demonstrating judicial con
cern over the scope of the felony-murder rule, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky presented a hypothetical felony-murder problem:
54. What of those successful felons who faced the gallows as a result of being con
victed of a felony? Those whose malefactions did not result in homicide were, of course,
unaffected by the felony-murder rule; those whose conduct did result in homicide, how
ever, did fall under the felony-murder rule. Those hitter prisoners, in facing a possible
second death sentence for murder, were no worse off than they were upon conviction of
the underlying felony, however: a man can be hanged to death only once.
65. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 63 (footnote omitted).
66. Regina v. Seme, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311, 313 (Central Crim. Ct. 1887).
67. ld, quoted in Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 506, 436 N.E.2d 400,
409 (1982).
68. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 64-65.
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Under our statute, the removal of a cornerstone is ... a felony.
If, in attempting this offense, death were to result to one conspira
tor by his fellow accidentally dropping the stone upon him, no
Christian court would hesitate to apply this limitation [that the
rule be applied only to criminal acts whose natural tendency is to
produce death).69

In the United States, the felony-murder rule is, in many jurisdic
tions, restricted in its application to those felonies which are consid
ered to be inherently dangerous. 7o Those most often categorized as
such are burglary, arson, rape, and robbery.71 Both common experi
ence72 and the case reports 73 reflect that the commission of these
crimes poses a grave risk to human life. At least one authority has
concluded that, under the felony-murder rule as it is generally for
mulated in the United States, "[hJomicide is murder if the death re
sults from the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an
inherently dangerous felony."74 There is, however, disagreement
over the meaning of "inherently dangerous."75 One approach, the
"manner of commission" test, examines the facts of the particular
69. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386,416,61 S.W. 735, 742 (1901).
70. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 64-65. See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra
note 31, at 547. This statement comprehends its own converse; i.e., some jurisdictions do
not so restrict the reach of the felony-murder rule.
71. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 63. Some courts have limited the class of
underlying felonies to those crimes which were felonies at common law; e.g., burglary,
arson, rape, robbery, sodomy, mayhem, and larceny. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at
547.
72. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 63.
73. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 405 N.E.2d 939 (1980)
(breaking and entering a dwelling house in the daytime with intent to commit larceny
and to put a person therein in fear); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Mass. 660, 433
N.E.2d 878 (1982) (arson); Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 58 N.E.2d 241
(1944) (death resulting from a beating occurring in the commission of rape); Common
wealth v. Venuti, 315 Mass. 255, 52 N.E.2d 392 (1943) (robbery); Commonwealth v. Le
Page, 352 Mass. 403, 226 N.E.2d 200 (1967) (armed assault with intent to rob in a
dwelling house).
74. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 70. Professors LaFave and Scott note,
tellingly, that some cases proclaim the scope of the felony-murder rule to be very general,
while in fact the cases usually involve an underlying felony that is inherently dangerous.
LAF AVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 546. They note further that a limitation on the
felony-murder rule should be worded in terms of inherently dangerous felonies, id at
547, rather than by naming specific felonies, since not all common law felonies (e.g.,
larceny) are dangerous, see id In their view, those felonies which are not dangerous
should be punished as manslaughter rather than murder if the homicide occurs in an
"extraordinary, unforeseeable" manner, id n.12; further, there are statutory felonies, as
opposed to common law felonies (e.g., abortion and kidnapping), that should be pun
ished as murder if they are committed in such a way that death is a foreseeable result, id
75. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 547.
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case, including the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
felony and the defendant's conduct, to see whether there existed a
foreseeable danger to human life; the other approach, the "inher
ently dangerous" test, examines the particular felony in the abstract,
rather than with reference to the way in which it was committed.16
C.

Overview of the Massachusetts Law of Murder Prior to
Commonwealth v. Matchett

Murder, within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, remains
the same as at common law: "[t]he killing of a human being, with
malice aforethought."?? "Malice aforethought" names the mental
states which transform homicide into murder.?8 As a requirement for
murder, malice aforethought is satisfied by the mental element that
accompanies homicide committed with (I) an intent to kill,79 (2) an
intent to inflict great bodily injury,80 (3) an intent to do an act in
wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human risk,8l and
(4) an intent to perpetrate a dangerous felony.82 Moreover, the mal
ice aforethought element of murder does not require the foreseeabil
ity of the occurrence of death or great bodily injury.83 It includes all
unlawful and unjustifiable motives 84 and is "implied from any delib
erate or cruel act against another."8s
Murder is classified, according to its gravity, as murder in the
first degree or murder in the second degree. 86 The Massachusetts
76. Id See also Note, Criminal Law-Felony-Murder Rule in Missouri-The Un
derlying Felony Need Not Be Inherently Dangerous, 41 Mo. L. REV. 595, 599 n.23 (1976);
Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 397 (1973).
77. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 277, § 39 (West 1972). See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 686, 393 N.E.2d 820, 825 (1979); Commonwealth v.
McGuirk, 376 Mass. 338, 344, 380 N.E.2d 662, 666 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1120
(1979); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 356 Mass. 442, 444, 252 N.E.2d 880, 881 (1969); Com
monwealth v. McCauley, 355 Mass. 554, 559, 246 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1969); Common
wealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 315, 151 N.E. 297, 299-300 (1926); Commonwealth v.
Desmarteau, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 1,9 (1860). See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
78. Campbell, 378 Mass. at 686, 393 N.E.2d at 825.
79. Id
80. Id
81. See Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass.. 245, 252, 54 N.E. 551, 554 (1899),
quoted in Commonwealth v. Swift, 382 Mass. 78, 83, 413 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1980). See
also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 541-44.
82. Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 n.2, 405 N.E.2d 939, 944 n.2
(1980). See supra text accompanying note 41.
83. Commonwealth v. Starling, 382 Mass. 423,428,416 N.E.2d 929, 932 (1981).
84. Commonwealth v. Boyajian, 344 Mass. 44, 48-49, 181 N.E.2d 577,580 (1962).
85. Commonwealthv. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 304 (1850).
86. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970). See also Commonwealth v.
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murder statute87 follows, roughly, the "Pennsylvania pattem":88
Murder in the first degree is murder committed (1) with deliberately
premeditated malice aforethought, (2) with extreme atrocity or cru
elty, (3) in the commission of a crime punishable with death or im
prisonment for life,89 or (4) in the attempted commission of a crime
punishable with death or imprisonment for life;90 all other killing
with malice aforethought constitutes murder in the second degree. 91
Although the Massachusetts murder statute does not codify the
common law felony-murder rule, that rule is, nevertheless, applica
ble within the Commonwealth.92 In a prosecution for felony-mur
der, the intent to commit the underlying felony has been held to
supply the element of malice aforethought,93 so that a murder con
viction could be based upon a showing that the defendant committed
the homicide while engaged in the commission of a felony.94 Be
cause the statute speaks only in terms of "murder," it cannot be in
voked until a murder has been established. 95 Once this has been
done through the application of the felony-murder rule, however,
the statute provides that those felony-murders based on an underly
ing felony punishable with death or life imprisonment are first de
gree murders,96 while all other felony-murders are second degree
murders. 97

DiStasio, 298 Mass. 562, 564, 11 N.E.2d 799, 801 (1937). See supra text accompanying
notes 46-47.
87. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970).
88. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
89. All offenses so punishable are included within the scope of MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970). Commonwealth v. Pemberton, 118 Mass. 36,42 (1875).
90. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970).
91. Id The degree of murder is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. Id
92. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. "[W)hen a defendant by some act done
in the commission or attempted commission of some . . . felony causes the death of a
human being, the killing is with malice aforethought and is murder." Commonwealth v.
Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 315, 151 N.E. 297, 299-300 (1926).
93. Madeiros, 255 Mass. at 315, 151 N.E. at 299-300. See supra notes 54-57 and
accompanying text.
94. Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 512, 209 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1965).
95. The only function of the Massachusetts murder statute is to categorize a mur
der as murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree. See supra notes 87-91,
46-50 and accompanying text.
96. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970).
97. Id
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MODIFICATION OF THE FELONy-MURDER RULE IN

MASSACHUSETTS IN LIGHT OF MATCHETT AND "THE
MA TCHETT PRINCIPLE"

A.

Holding

In Commonwealth v. Matchett ,98 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts faced the issue of the applicability of the common law
felony-murder rule to a homicide occurring during the attempted
commission of the statutory crime of extortion. 99 The court quickly
dismissed as mere dicta those prior statements found in the case re
ports to the effect that the common law felony-murder rule loo could
be applied as a talisman 101 to any and all felonies. 102 Stating that "[a]
rule of law assumed, but not decided, is not binding on this
court," 103 the court made clear its intention to be free of any false
notions of precedent as it undertook the task of shaping the common
law of felony-murder. 104
Motivated by the desire to uphold what it considered to be a
fundamental principle of criminal justice, that "'criminal liability
for causing a particular result is not justified in the absence of some
98. 386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982).
99. Id at 498-99, 436 N.E.2d at 405. Other issues raised on appeal were (I) the
sufficiency of the evidence of an (attempted) extortion, the finding of which was a condi
tion precedent to the use of the felony-murder rule; (2) the sufficiency of the judge's
instruction regarding the necessity, on the issue of the existence of extortion, of finding
that a threat was uttered; (3) the constitutionality of the felony-murder rule per se; and
(4) the denial by the trial court of defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during
a warrantless inventory search of defendant's car. Id at 493, 498-99 & n.8, 436 N.E.2d at
402,404-05 & n.8. None of these issues is within the scope of this casenote. Because the
decision rested on other grounds, the third issue, the constitutionality of the felony-mur
der rule, was not addressed by the court. Id at 508 n.17, 436 N.E.2d at 4\0 n.17.
100. For the purpose of this discussion, "common law felony-murder rule" means
the rule of law which deems as murder a homicide occurring during the commission or
attempted commission of a felony.
101. Matchell, 386 Mass. at 504-05, 436 N.E.2d at 408. "This court has never auto
matically applied the felony-murder rule without viewing the facts of the case." Id at
504, 436 N.E.2d at 408 (footnote omitted).
102. Id at 504 n.13, 436 N.E.2d at 408 n.\3.
\03. Id (citation omitted). But if. Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304,
315, 151 N.E. 297, 299-300 (1926) (jury correctly charged that when a defendant, by some
act done in the commission or attempted commission of a felony, causes the death of a
human being, the killing is with malice aforethought and is murder).
104. "We do not view the instant case as a departure from the Commonwealth's
common law felony-murder rule because this court has never held that the felony-mur
der rule was applicable to the statutory felony of extortion." Matchett, 386 Mass. at 505
n.14, 436 N.E.2d at 408 n.14.
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culpable mental state in respect to that result,' "105 and noting that
the felony-murder rule is a rule of "constructive malice" in that it
substitutes the intent to commit the underlying felony for the malice
aforethought that is an element of murder,106 the court summarily
rejected the automatic application of the felony-murder rule to any
and all felonies.107 In doing so, the court declared
"For this theory to be tenable the nature of the felony must be
such that an intent to commit that crime exhibits a conscious disre
gardfor human life, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of con
sequences and a mind regardless of social duty. Where, however,
the acts which constitute felonious conduct do not possess a suffi
cient danger to human life to justify the application of the doctrine
of common-law felony murder, the doctrine is inapplicable be
cause there is a failure to establish the requisite state of mind from
the forming of the intention to commit the felony."108

This statement foreshadowed the court's holding that, when a
death results from the commission or attempted commission of the
statutory felony of extortion, a conviction of felony-murder in the
second degree lO9 is not warranted unless "the jury find that the ex
tortion involved circumstances demonstrating the defendant's con
scious disregard ofthe risk to human life. The crime of extortion may
be committed in a way not inherently dangerous to human life. . . .
We conclude, therefore, that the judge's charge 110 was in error." 111
Because the trial judge did not require the jury to find a con
scious disregard of the risk to human life before applying the felony
murder rule, his charge constituted fundamental error, requiring a
105. Id at 506-07, 436 N.E.2d at 409 (quoting Gegan, Criminal Homicide in the
Revised New York Penal Law, 12 N.Y.L.F. 565, 586 (1966».
106. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 502, 436 N.E.2d at 407. See supra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text.
107. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 507-08, 436 N.E.2d at 410.
108. Id at 507, 436 N.E.2d at 410 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bowden, 456 Pa.
278,287,309 A.2d 714, 719 (1973) (Nix, J., concurring» (emphasis added).
109. Because the jury returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder, the
court found no need to discuss the applicability of the felony-murder rule to a first degree
murder charge based on the underlying felony of armed assault in a dwelling house with
intent to commit a felony. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 501 n.ll, 436 N.E.2d at 407 n.ll. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 18A (West 1970).
110. As to murder in the second degree based upon the application of the felony
murder rule to the underlying felony of statutory extortion, the judge charged, "If you
find. . . that the defendant was engaged in an attempted extortion, and that as a matter
of probable consequence of the commission of that extortion, [the decedent] was killed,
then you would find the defendant . . . guilty of murder in the second degree." Match
ett, 386 Mass. at 502 n.ll, 436 N.E.2d at 407 n.ll.
111. Id at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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reversal ofjudgment and a new trial. 1 12 A reversal is required under
such circumstances despite the possibility that the verdict of guilty of
murder in the second degree might not have been based on the fel
ony-murder rule at all. The judge instructed the jury both as to first
degree murder and second degree murder. With reference to the lat
ter, the jury was authorized to return a verdict of guilty based on
either a finding of express malice aforethought or on the application
of the felony-murder rule to the underlying felony of extortion, a
crime neither punishable by a death sentence nor by life imprison
ment. 113 The jury returned a general verdict of guilty of second de
gree murder. 1 14 From this verdict, it is impossible to tell whether the
jury found that defendant acted with express malice aforethought or
that he committed or attempted to commit statutory extortion and,
in doing so, caused the victim's death. Because the jury instruction
concerning felony-murder was deficient, the latter iof those two
grounds was insufficient to support a finding of guilt. Under the
command of the Supreme Court in Yates v. United States,II,5 a ver
dict must be reversed when it is supportable on one ground, but not
on another, and it is not possible to discern the ground upon which
the jury relied in reaching a verdict of guilty,ll6 Therefore, despite
the possibility that the jury found express malice aforethought, the
verdict was reversed and the case remanded to the superior court for
a new trial. 117
B.

"Conscious Disregard oj'the Risk to Human Life"

The most remarkable aspect of Matchett is the wording of the
holding. In formulating a new standard under which the felony
murder rule may be invoked in the prosecution of homicides occur
ring during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of statutory
extortion, the court held that the jury must "find that the extortion
112, /d. at 508, 511, 436 N.E.2d at 410,412.
113. Matchell, 386 Mass. at 498, 436 N.E.2d at 404. See supra note 22 and accom
panying text. The jury was also authorized to return a verdict of guilty of murder in the
first degree based on either a finding of deliberately premeditated malice aforethought or
on the application of the felony-murder rule to the underlying felony of armed assault in
a dwelling house with the intent to commit a felony, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for life. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 497, 436 N.E.2d at 404. See supra note 22 and accompa
nying text.
114. Matchell, 386 Mass. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402.
115. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
116. /d. at 311-12.
117. Matchell, 386 Mass. at 511, 436 N.E.2d at 412. Defendant was also convicted
of firearms violations; those convictions were affirmed. /d. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402.
See supra note 23.
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involved circumstances demonstrating the defendant's conscious dis
regard of the risk to human l!fe. "118 That phrase is based on the
concurring opinion of a 1973 Pennsylvania case. 119 In the context of
that concurring opinion, the state of mind described exhibits not
only a conscious disregard of the risk to human life, but also "hard
ness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind re
gardless of social duty."120 This is the common description of a
"depraved heart," which is one of the states of mind that constitute
malice aforethought. 121
The Model Penal Code sheds light on the meaning of "a con
scious disregard of the risk to human life." The Code defines as
murder a criminal homicide committed "recklessly under circum
stances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life"; 122 criminal homicide committed with ordinary recklessness is
simply manslaughter. 123 Recklessness presupposes an awareness
and conscious disregard of a substantial homicidal risk. 124 To deter
mine whether the defendant's recklessness is sufficient to support a
conviction of murder rather than manslaughter, the key, under the
Model Penal Code, is whether the circumstances of the crime indi
cate that the defendant, in consciously disregarding the risk to
human life, acted with "extreme indifference to the value of human
life."125 If so, the defendant is guilty of murder; if not, he is guilty
only of manslaughter. Again, in context, the phrase upon which the
Matchett court drew l26 indicates extreme indifference to the value of
human life and, hence, murder. 127
\18. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410 (emphasis added).
119. Commonwealth v. Bowden, 456 Pa. 278, 287, 309 A.2d 714, 719 (1973) (Nix,
J., concurring).
120. Bowden, 456 Pa. at 287, 309 A.2d at 719 (Nix, J., concurring). See supra text
accompanying note 108. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment I (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1962).
121. See LAFAVE & Scan, supra note 31, at 542.
122. MODEL PENAL CODE § 21O.2(1)(b) (1962).
123. Id. § 21O.3(1)(a).
124. Id. § 210.2 comment 4.
125. Id.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
127. The Model Penal Code departs from the traditional felony-murder rule.
Under the Code, criminal homicide is presumed to be committed recklessly under cir
cumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life if the actor is
engaged in, or is an accomplice in, the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or fiight
after committing or attempting to commit, robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by
force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or felonious escape; i.e., criminal
homicide occurring under such circumstances constitutes murder. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 21O.2(1)(b). Even with this presumption, the prosecution has the burden of persuasion
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The court forced the conclusion that "a conscious disregard of
the risk to human life" refers to malice when it wrote that "the
means utilized to effect the extortion could be considered by the jury
on the issue of malice, i.e., whether these means and the methods
used by the defendant demonstrated a conscious disregard of the risk
to human life."128 This statement is important for two reasons.
First, on its face, it allows a jury to find malice by finding a conscious
disregard of the risk to human life; i.e., the jury can infer malice
from the means used by the defendant in committing the extortion
by finding that those means demonstrate a conscious disregard of the
risk to human life: This the jury could not do unless "conscious dis
regard of the risk to human life" represents a state of mind that coin
cides, at least to some degree, with the state of mind known as
"malice aforethought." Second, if it is possible to infer a state of
mind less culpable than malice from means that demonstrate a con
scious disregard of the risk to human life, then the invocation of the
felony-murder rule under those circumstances would violate the
spirit of the Matchett holding because doing so would cause a find
ing of criminal liability for murder despite the absence of a culpable
mental state with respect to the underlying homicide. 129 Therefore,
the phrase "conscious disregard of the risk to human life" must rep
resent a state of mind that is not merely coincidental to some degree
with the state of mind known as "malice aforethought," but a state
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted recklessly and with extreme indiffer
ence to the value of human life. The jury may regard the facts giving rise to the pre
sumption as sufficient evidence of the required culpability unless the court determines
that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives that conclusion. The presumption may, of
course, be rebutted by the defendant or may simply not be followed by the jury; if so, the
defendant may be liable for manslaughter or negligent homicide. If the presumption is
not rebutted and if the jury finds, with or without its aid, that the requisite extreme
indifference in fact existed beyond a reasonable doubt, then the appropriate conviction is
for murder.
128. Matchell, 386 Mass. at 511, 436 N.E.2d at 412. To prepare the jury for that
task, a judge might recite the following instruction:
If you find that the defendant committed or attempted to commit the statutory
crime of extortion, and, as a consequence of having done so, the decedent was
killed, then you must decide whether that killing was murder. Murder is "the
killing, with malice aforethought, of one human being by another." On the
issue of malice aforethought, you may consider the means utilized to effect the
extortion; that is to say, whether the means and methods used by the defendant
demonstrate a conscious disregard of the risk to human life. If you find that the
means and methods used by the defendant to effect the extortion do in fact
demonstrate a conscious disregard of the risk to human life, you will have
found that the defendant acted with malice aforethought and you will, there
fore, return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree.
129. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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of mind that is in fact synonymous with "malice aforethought." This.
conclusion demonstrates, again, the redundant nature of the holding
in Matchett. Matchett requires that before the felony-murder rule
may be applied, the jury first find that the defendant acted in con
scious disregard of the risk to human life.l3O Making such a finding,
however, is tantamount to finding that the defendant acted with mal
ice. Once the jury has found malice aforethought, there is no need to
invoke the felony-murder rule, since that rule is a "mens rea-impos
ing mechanism"131 and malice is the mens rea of murder.!32 Having
shown a homicide accompanied by "conscious disregard of the risk
to human life," the prosecutor has made out a case of murder; he
need not then ask the jury to return a verdict of guilty through the
application of the felony-murder rule.
C.

The Matchett Principle Extended to Crimes Other Than
Extortion

At best, the holding in Matchett is obscure; at worst, it is self
contradictory and represents a redundancy in the law of homicide.
If the holding were to be restricted to homicides occurring during the
commission of the statutory felony of extortion, its effect would be
more academic than practical because it is not to be expected that
extortion will often lead to homicide.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Moran, \33 decided five months
after Matchett, however, the supreme judicial court extended the
Matchett principle to the crime of unarmed robbery.l34 Moran and
an accomplice robbed their victim after leaving a bar in which the
three of them had been drinking together. 135 The intoxicated victim
suffered blows to the head during the course of the robbery, was
stuffed into the cab of his pickup truck, and asphyxiated after aspi
rating his own vomit.!36 While reaffirming that the felony-murder
rule is "the law of this Commonwealth,"!37 the supreme judicial
court held that because unarmed robbery is not inherently danger
ous, the felony-murder rule is not applicable to that crime unless
"the jury find from the circumstances of the felony that the defend
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Matchell, 386 Mass. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410.
See supra text accompanying note 56.
See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
387 Mass. 644, 442 N.E.2d 399 (1982).
fd. at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403.
fd. at 645, 442 N.E.2d at 400.
fd. at 645-46, 442 N.E.2d at 400.
137. fd. at 648, 442 N.E.2d at 402 (citations omitted).

1984)

FELONY-MURDER RULE

1099

ant consciously disregarded [the] risk to human life."138
Having, in Moran, extended the Matchett principle to unarmed
robbery, it appears that the supreme judicial court will restrict the
scope of the felony-murder rule whenever it can. Particularly vul
nerable to the court's analysis will be those felonies which are not
"inherently dangerous to human life"I39 and those which "can be
committed without danger to human life."I40 While the Moran
court did not state that an unarmed robbery accompanied by manual
blows to the head, such as that which occurred in Moran, can be
conceived of as being not inherently dangerous to human life, the
court did state that unarmed robbery per se is not inherently danger
ous and that the felony-murder rule may not be invoked in the pros
ecution of that crime unless the jury were to find from the
circumstances that the defendant consciously disregarded the risk to
human life. 141 If unarmed robbery per se is not inherently danger
ous to human life, there is no reason not to believe that armed rob
bery accomplished by intimidation rather than by force can be
committed without posing an inherent danger to life. Moreover, it is
conceivable that the other felonies traditionally associated with the
felony-murder rule, burglary, arson, and rape, can also be commit
ted without danger to human life. In the trial of a homicide associ
ated with any of these crimes, the Matchett principle would require
that the jury first find that the defendant consciously disregarded the
risk to human life in committing the underlying felony before the
jury could apply the felony-murder rule.
That requirement effectively abrogates the felony-murder rule
by subsuming what otherwise would be the felony-murder theory of
a prosecution into a conventional murder theory under which the
jury infers malice from the means used by the defendant in commit
ting the underlying felony by finding that those means display a con
138. ld at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403. "The Matchell principle" was enunciated by
the court in the following way:
The holding in Matchell was based on our recognition that extortion can
be committed without danger to human life and on the principle that "criminal
liability for causing a particular result is not justified in the absence of some
culpable mental state in respect to that result. ..."
Though Matchell involved only felony-murder based on extortion, its prin
ciple applies as well to felony-murder based on unarmed robbery. Unarmed
robbery is not inherently dangerous to human life.
ld at 650-51, 442 N.E.2d at 403 (citations omitted).
139. See id at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403; Matchett, 386 Mass. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at
410 (citation omitted).
140. Moran, 387 Mass. at 650, 442 N.E.2d at 403.
141. ld at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403.
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scious disregard of the risk to human life. The felony-murder rule is
abrogated because, under the requirements of Matchett, the role that
it might have played in the prosecution, that of implying malice on
the part of the defendant, is rendered unnecessary: Once malice has
been established by a finding of a conscious disregard of the risk to
human life, murder is proven; thereafter, there is no need to invoke
the felony-murder rule. Yet, in establishing this requirement in
Matchett and Moran, the court, at the same time, declared the fel
ony-murder rule to be "the law of this Commonwealth."142
If it is the desire of the supreme judicial court to abrogate the
felony-murder rule, the court should do so openly. With the advent
of the Matchett principle, the felony-murder rule continues to exist
in form but not in substance. The Matchett principle adds nothing
other than confusion to the law of homicide. Other states have
openly abrogated the felony-murder rule. 143 In its modern statutory
analysis of the felony-murder rule, Hawaii declared that total abro
gation, as opposed to judicial limitation of the scope of the felony
murder rule, is the wiser course:
Even in its limited formulation the felony-murder rule is still ob
jectionable. It is not sound principle to convert an accidental, neg
ligent, or reckless homicide into a murder simply because, without
more, the killing was in furtherance of a criminal objective of
some defined class. Engaging in certain penally-prohibited be
havior may, of course, evidence a recklessness sufficient to estab
lish manslaughter, or a practical certainty or intent, with respect to
causing death, sufficient to establish murder, but such a finding is
an independent determination which must rest on the facts of each
case. . . . There appears to be no logical base for the felony-mur
der rule which presumes, either conclusively or subject to rebuttal,
culpability sufficient to establish murder. l44

V.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the holdings in Commonwealth v. Matchett 145 and
Commonwealth v. Moran, 146 the felony-murder rule is, at present, in
a state of de facto abrogation in Massachusetts. The de jure abroga
142. Moran, 387 Mass. at 648, 442 N.E.2d at 402 (citations omitted).
143. For a general discussion of the modem treatment of the felony-murder rule,
see People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 699-707, 299 N.W.2d 304, 312-16 (1980).
144. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-701, commentary at 346-47 (1976) (footnotes and
citation omitted).
145. 386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982).
146. 387 Mass. 644, 442 N.E.2d 399 (1982).
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tion of the rule, therefore, would not change the substance of the
law, but would simply clarify the law's uncertain status. Since "a
conscious disregard of the risk to human life" indicates, in the con
text of the opinion upon which the supreme judicial court drew, ex
treme indifference to the value of life, the prosecutor would be free,
even after an express abrogation of the felony-murder rule, to prove
malice aforethought, with respect to a homicide that is the result of
the commission or attempted commission of a felony, by showing,
from the circumstances of the felony, that the defendant acted in
conscious disregard of the risk of that result. This would return to
the jury its historical function of determining the existence of malice
directly,147 rather than indirectly through the application of the fel
ony-murder rule. 148
Michael G. Rikard

147. PERKINS & BoycE, supra note 29, at 73-74 (malice is a psychical fact to be
determined by the jury).
148. One functional aspect of the felony-murder rule would survive the general
abrogation of the rule: upon a finding that a murder occurred in the context of a felony,
the degree of murder would be fixed by statute depending on the type of felony. Those
murders occurring in the context of a felony punishable with death or imprisonment for
life would constitute murder in the first degree; all other murders would be murder in the
second degree. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970).

